

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

ENDC/PV.397
25 March 1969

ENGLISH

AUG 15 1969

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 March 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. KLUSAK

(Czechoslovakia)

GE.69-7036
69-35268

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. P.C. de MELLO
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U CHIT MYAING
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. KLUSAK
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. SAFAR
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. M. ZAGARI
Mr. R. CARACCIOLI
Mr. R. GAJA
Mr. R. PETRIGNANI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS
Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI

Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Mr. R. WLAZLO

Mr. S. DABROWA

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO

Mr. V. TARZIORU

Mr. C. GEORGESCO

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY

Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV

Mr. N.S. KISHILOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. O. SIRRY

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER

Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY

Mr. M.E. HOWELL

United States of America:

Mr. G.C. SMITH

Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN

Mr. L.D. WEILER

Mr. W. GIVAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the 397th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. May I, with the indulgence of the Committee, say a few purely personal words before calling on the first speaker.
3. First of all, I should like to thank the heads of delegation who extended to me, as the new leader of the Czechoslovak delegation, a friendly welcome at the two previous meetings of the Committee, in which I could not participate. I am particularly pleased to meet here a number of old friends and colleagues with whom I have had the honour to co-operate in various United Nations bodies. Seeing here so many acquaintances among the members of the delegations as well as among members of the Secretariat makes it easier for me to participate again in the Committee's work, which I have followed with great interest since I last sat here as a Czechoslovak representative.
4. I also welcome the opportunity to co-operate at this session with a number of other outstanding personalities, well-known experts in the field of disarmament, with whom I have not yet had the honour to be associated in this joint work.
5. On behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation may I also be permitted to welcome in our midst the new representatives of their respective countries: Ambassador Ignatieff, Ambassador Frazão and Ambassador Smith, as well as Ambassador García Robles, who has rejoined the Committee after a period of absence.
6. In my capacity as Chairman, and thus on behalf of all the members of the Committee, may I now extend a warm welcome to Mr. Mario Zagari, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is here with us for the first time, as head of the Italian delegation? I should also like to welcome back to the Committee as the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Alva Myrdal.
7. Mr. SMITH (United States of America): I have listened with close attention to the statements that have been made by various representatives here since the opening of this session of our Conference and fully appreciate the concerns that have been expressed about the need to move forward with the work of our Committee. I share the hopes that this and subsequent sessions will be productive. I appreciate the opportunity to hear the observations of my colleagues here, both in formal meetings and in equally important private conversations.

(Mr. Smith, United States)

8. Good will alone cannot create results. All of us know only too well that it is not enough to be for peace; we must also work for concrete measures that make for peace. Only through the constant efforts of people determined to change the world will we move forward to our common goals.

9. May I be permitted to make a personal comment? It was this kind of determined effort by the men who have served before me in the United States Government that helped to make possible the achievements of the past few years. Bill Foster, my distinguished predecessor and long-time friend, and Adrian Fisher, whose able mind has contributed to the solution of so many problems, have helped members of this Conference to turn hope into reality. I shall seek to emulate them.

10. I wish at this time to make some general observations about our work and then to set forth the views of the United States on one of the items in our agenda.

11. First there is the question of where we are, and where and by what means we should go from here. Certain limited but still highly significant successes have been achieved in the past. I need not elaborate on these to this Conference, but we must not forget that the first steps are sometimes the most difficult. Moreover, our achievements have significance beyond their direct effects for they have started the process of bringing the nuclear arms race under some control. Certainly the world is different today from what it would have been without those agreements.

12. As for the future, progress on arms control and disarmament is a many-faceted undertaking. We need not and should not be forced into an arbitrary decision as to which area or measure should receive priority to the exclusion of others. Of course, we can determine which areas have a logical relationship to the foundations we have already laid and to our goals for the foreseeable future. My point is that we should not be rigid in our priorities.

13. I think this Committee can and should explore various measures concurrently. In that way our understanding can be increased and our differences reduced. It is to be hoped that some agreements can be reached without delay.

14. It is not fair or necessary to assume that the monopoly of the time of this Committee which the negotiations for the non-proliferation Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII, annex) produced will be repeated in connexion with some other arms control measure. There are few negotiations that are without complications, and I

(Mr. Smith, United States)

do not infer that our task in the future will be simple. However, it is important that we keep in mind that the non-proliferation negotiations were of a special kind. Some students of current history have said that, because of the variety of technical and political issues involved and the number of countries immediately affected, those negotiations were among the most complicated and involved international negotiations since the end of the Second World War. Therefore I believe that we should not be too concerned that any one measure might monopolize the attention of this Committee. We must try to move forward in all relevant areas while remaining alert to any opportunities to move forward more rapidly to the conclusion of a particular agreement. Any agreement we reach makes other possible accords less difficult and more probable.

15. President Nixon, in his letter (ENDC/239)* which I submitted on 18 March, discussed areas which the United States believes merit particular attention.

16. There is common agreement, I believe, that the prospects for progress in one particular area lie in bilateral discussions. A number of representatives here have quite rightly referred to the importance of prospective strategic arms limitation talks. The critical significance of such talks in the efforts to bring the nuclear arms race under control is obvious. That the obligations of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty are relevant in this regard no one would dispute. But I think it is important that we keep in mind that it is a question not merely of obligation, but rather of opportunity to control the nuclear arms race and thereby increase international security and reduce the burdens of the arms race, that is of greatest relevancy.

17. In this regard it should perhaps be pointed out that under the recent Administration of President Johnson the United States Government had made preparations and last August was ready and willing to commence such negotiations on strategic arms limitations. Now it is only prudent for the new Administration of my country to prepare itself thoroughly for negotiations that could be of a most sensitive nature, going to the heart of the strategic balance in the world and having a direct and central bearing on the mutual security of the United States, its allies, and indeed much of the world. In matters of this magnitude careful preparation is the greatest contribution that a nation can make to fruitful negotiations.

18. The question of timing is thus two-fold. The passage of some time is needed for the new Administration to make the necessary preparations; and the timing should be favourable in a political sense if even carefully prepared strategic arms limitation talks are to proceed with real promise of being productive.

(Mr. Smith, United States)

19. At this point I should like to submit one additional thought which I would hope members of this Committee and their Governments would keep in mind. My Government is fully aware of the responsibilities which it, along with others, carries to make every effort to halt the nuclear arms race. Therefore in major national defence decisions taken in the present, and in the absence of relevant arms-control agreements, every effort is made to see that they are not provocative and that they will not make arms-control negotiations more difficult. This type of consideration, we believe, is also in the spirit of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

20. With respect to the questions on the agenda of this Committee (ENDC/236, p.3), the United States, as I have indicated, will submit views during the course of this session which we hope will contribute to progress in our work. In particular, I hope we can have profitable and realistic exchanges on a comprehensive test ban and on the long-standing proposal for a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. My delegation will return to these matters in later statements.

21. We have not failed to note the importance attached to progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This general concern is evident not only in the joint memorandum of 26 August 1968 (ENDC/235) submitted by eight members of this Conference and in a recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (2455 (XXIII); ENDC/237), but also in the remarks of previous speakers during the present session.

22. My Government understands and shares the vital concern felt by others. President Nixon's message reaffirmed our commitment to the goal of a comprehensive test ban, adequately verified. To achieve adequate verification, the principles and techniques of verification methods, their capabilities and limitations must be understood and appropriately implemented in any comprehensive test-ban agreement. It is well known that we continue to believe that a certain number of on-site inspections are essential for adequate verification.

23. With respect to seismic research designed to improve seismic verification methods, I am gratified by the intercast expressed so recently by Ambassador Sule Kolo of

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Nigeria (ENDC/PV.396, para. 14) and Ambassador Porter of the United Kingdom (ibid., paras. 27 et seq.) in the United States seismic investigation proposal which was set forth on 5 December 1968 by my predecessor, Ambassador Foster, in the First Committee of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1630, pp.18-20). I can now say that in the course of this year there are two possible nuclear experiments in the United States Atomic Energy Commission's "Plowshare" programme that could be used in implementing our seismic investigation proposal. These experiments are research and development tests in the field of commercial application, and they will depend upon the working out of necessary arrangements with private concerns involved. Until such arrangements are final, data concerning them must be considered tentative.

24. As currently programmed, these two experiments are to take place in west-central Colorado. The first of these would be held in late May or June and the second towards the end of the year. The first experiment is conceived as a forty-kiloton explosion -- with a possible upper limit of sixty kilotons -- which is to take place in a type of sandstone at a depth of a mile and a half. The second would be similar to the "Gas Buggy" experiment, with which I am sure you are familiar. Its yield would be about twenty-six kilotons and it would be detonated at a depth of 3,300 feet -- also in a form of sandstone. As final contract arrangements are completed, we will be in a position to make available more specific data on time, location, geological medium, depth and yield for these tests.

25. I think all delegations here have also given attention to the 1968 report (ENDC/230) on seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions, drawn up under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research at Stockholm (SIPRI). The advances in seismic science described in that report were the product of research conducted in a number of countries represented here. We hope that such research will continue to be pursued diligently, and that the conclusions contained in this SIPRI report will be further refined. We believe this type of research will assist us in our task of achieving an adequately verified comprehensive test-ban treaty.

26. Today, however, I wish to set forth some substantive comments on another item on our agenda. I refer to the question of arms control for the sea-bed. I should like to use my remaining time to present observations on this subject for two reasons. First, it is appropriate that various views on this subject should be submitted for

(Mr. Smith, United States)

consideration early in our session because this is a relatively new item. There is a background of facts, positions and views on several of the other items, but this item is not one where a full understanding of facts and attitudes of the various countries is at present available to form the basis for serious discussion. Therefore, it seems wise for the United States delegation at the outset to submit some comments on this subject, as the Soviet delegation submitted some views on this subject in the form of a draft treaty (ENDC/240) -- although my delegation does not believe we are quite at the stage where trying to agree on treaty language would be the best way to go about reaching an agreement.

27. Secondly, it is appropriate to discuss the sea-bed item now because there is intrinsic merit in our seeking to prevent a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed while there is still time. This has been called preventive disarmament or preventive non-armament. The significance of action to preclude new types of arms races from beginning should never be under-emphasized if we are to be successful in our efforts to halt the arms race. Our initial successes so far have been partial efforts to limit the arms race in some areas or to exclude other areas from arms competition. We have been trying with some success to fence in the arms race. This is true of the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). It is true of the Antarctic Treaty and, in a more significant sense, of the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) annex).

28. If we ignore areas of potential arms development while exploring areas of present arms competition, we run the risk that the potentials for agreement in the areas where there is at present an arms competition may, as the moment of success draws nearer, be neutralized or upset by a developing arms competition in a new area.

29. There is a third and perhaps intangible reason why it would be important to reach agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons on the sea-bed. Even if such an agreement might not trench upon existing military competition, it could not help but have certain positive psychological and political effects upon the international scene.

30. May I therefore make some initial observations on the problem of preventing the sea-bed from becoming an area for the nuclear arms race?

(Mr. Smith, United States)

31. We are all aware that in the past two years the international community has become increasingly interested in the possibilities of exploring and exploiting the vast resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The United Nations General Assembly responded to this interest by establishing first an Ad Hoc Committee (resolution 2340 (XXII)) and then a permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (resolution 2467 A (XXIII), para. 3).

The United Nations has called upon the permanent Committee to -- inter alia "... study further, within the context of the title of the item, and taking into account the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament, the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor without prejudice to the limits which may be agreed upon in this respect".

The request in that resolution that the sea-bed Committee should take into account international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament is a clear indication that the Committee, now concluding its first working session in New York, will closely watch what progress is made here on the question of sea-bed arms limitations.

32. Technological advances are continually being made which increase the types and extent of operations on the sea-bed. At present the high cost of operating in this difficult environment has effectively limited commercial exploitation to relatively shallow waters. However, it seems clear that scientific and commercial activities will soon be moving into deeper waters. Likewise, as technical capabilities are developed and improved the possibility increases that the sea-bed could be used as a new environment for the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

33. The United States is interested in taking realistic steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed. We are pleased that other delegations share an interest in working out an effective and viable international agreement. In this regard the draft treaty submitted to this Committee by the Soviet Union is being studied with great interest in Washington, and we expect to comment on it more fully at a future meeting.

(Mr. Smith, United States)

34. In examining the question of arms control on the sea-bed we must consider that some sea-bed uses, such as communication and navigation aids, are for both military and non-military purposes. The existence of submarine fleets requires States to take action in self-defence, such as establishing warning systems that use the sea-bed. Moreover, much useful scientific research on the sea-bed is supported or carried out by military personnel using military non-weapons equipment. Therefore we must point out that complete demilitarization of the sea-bed would, in our judgement, be simply unworkable and probably harmful.

35. Moreover, the United States believes that it is completely impractical to try to prohibit conventional weapons on the sea-bed. Encumbering a sea-bed arms control measure with that type of prohibition would raise insuperable verification problems. Such considerations illustrate the need for a careful study of all the relevant factors in developing an acceptable agreement.

36. The United States offers the following criteria for consideration of a sea-bed agreement and would welcome the views of other delegations on these or other relevant factors.

37. First, the United States believes that the most urgent problem is the danger of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. Such deployments, whether nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological in nature, should be banned. In view of the possibility that some State might make advance preparation for the sudden abrogation of any treaty ban of this nature, consideration should be given to whether sea-bed-based launching platforms and delivery vehicles for such weapons should be included under the ban.

38. Second, the objective of the prohibition is to block deployment of specific weapons on, within, beneath or to the sea-bed. To achieve that, careful consideration must be given to the exact definition of the words "emplace or fix". We must consider whether they should apply only to permanent installations affixed to or implanted in the sea-bed, or also to containers or carriers whose principal mode of deployment or operation requires physical contact with the sea-bed. At the same time we should take care that the prohibition applies only to the sea-bed and not to the superjacent waters. The age-old doctrine of freedom of navigation is the foundation of international maritime law, and we must be certain that our agreement in no way infringes that freedom.

(Mr. Smith, United States)

39. Third, in order to constitute a genuine and stable contribution to international peace and security, any arms control measure relating to the sea-bed should be of such a nature that the participating countries could feel confident that all participants were fulfilling their obligations. Verification of compliance could involve special problems in the geographically hostile environment of the sea-bed. Nevertheless, the United States, which has consistently supported the principles of adequate verification of arms control measures believes that some appropriate provision must be included in the agreement in order to provide the needed reassurances that all the provisions are being complied with. In this respect it may be desirable to draw on useful precedents of the outer space Treaty to establish a right of access and inspection. Such a right should be based on reciprocity and should not confer, or imply the existence of, any right or power to veto proposed visits.

40. As in outer space, the difficulties of the environment probably require that representatives should give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit. That would permit maximum precautions to be taken to avoid dangers to personnel and the disruption of the normal operations of the equipment or the facility.

41. Consideration of the verification question also demonstrates the need to restrict the scope of the prohibition to weapons of mass destruction, since otherwise the task of inspecting the multitude of present and future facilities would be beyond capabilities.

42. Fourth, one of the most difficult questions is the definition of the boundaries beyond which the prohibition would apply. Regardless of the method which might be agreed, the United States believes that the goal should be to apply the arms control measure to as broad an area of the sea-bed as possible; therefore the prohibition should, we think, apply to the sea-bed beyond a narrow band along the coasts of States. To the extent possible, the method chosen to define that band should provide ease of determination and uniformity of interpretation, and should be equitable in its application. For example, the zone could be defined by several methods such as:

- (1) A specified horizontal distance from the coast;
- (2) The use of a specified isobath or depth limit which would generally follow the contour of the sea-bed; or

(Mr. Smith, United States)

(3) As some have suggested, a method based on the outer limits of national jurisdiction derived from either sovereignty or sovereign rights. This approach, at first glance, would appear feasible because it is based on existing boundary claims. However, the differences in the international community regarding the legitimate extent of such claims would result in gross inequities and would weaken the effect of the measure by excluding wide areas of the sea-bed from the zone of application.

43. Those are some of the considerations which will need to be discussed before an effective international agreement can be worked out, and we urge the Committee to undertake such discussions as soon as possible. In this way we shall be doing what the world community expects of us: seeking ways to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to new environments, and at the same time helping to ensure that the potential for peaceful purposes of this great area of our planet will be enhanced. If we can do this much, it will be no small accomplishment. In effect, we shall have placed nearly 70 per cent of the earth's surface off-limits to the arms race and shall have achieved a significant restraint on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction.

44. I am sorry I have had to make a rather lengthy statement today, particularly in view of the fact that there are still two representatives on the list of speakers for today. I did, however, wish to set forth the considerations in my statement, since I shall have to return for a time to Washington, where, as you know, I have the responsibility of heading a Federal Agency. Since I only recently assumed this position, the obligations requiring my presence in Washington are obviously greater than will normally be the case. I am glad to say that after my departure the United States delegation will be headed by Mr. Adrian Fisher, whose abilities and whose contributions in the past are well known to members of this Committee. I hope that through deliberations in this Committee we shall move forward to new agreements. While I am in Washington I shall devote my efforts to ensuring that the United States contribution to that task is a positive one.

45. Finally, on behalf of my delegation I should like to welcome the return to this Committee of the doyenne of our disarmament negotiations, Mrs. Myrdal, and to express our pleasure in having the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Zagari, with us today. I should also like to thank other representatives for their warm words of welcome to me.

46. Mr. ZAGARI (Italy) (translation from French): First of all I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well as the distinguished representative of the United States, for the friendly words of welcome addressed to me.

47. I am particularly aware of the privilege it is to have the honour of addressing this Conference, whose essential task is to discuss problems of vital importance for the peace and future of mankind. It is not for me to recall how long and arduous has been the road followed by the disarmament negotiations in recent years and how, in alternate spurts of action and pauses, we have reached the present session of the Conference. It must unfortunately be recognized that, despite the efforts that have been made over a number of years, the results which we have obtained do not adequately meet the great hopes of the peoples of the world.

48. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament undertook its work seven years ago on the basis of a vast and ambitious programme. That programme was inspired by the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) adopted by the United States and Soviet Governments on 20 September 1961. But the debates soon bogged down. The two plans for general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) and by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) were in fact put to one side. In the meantime, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out in his message, since 1962 the yearly world military outlay has increased from about \$120,000 million to more than \$180,000 million (ENDC/PV.395, para. 4).

49. We then proceeded to consider partial and collateral measures which are not, properly speaking, disarmament measures. The main results obtained by this limited and sectoral approach were the partial test ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the Treaty on the denuclearization of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex) and the Treaty on non-proliferation (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex). Obviously these are important results but they are only side results. It must also be admitted that they were obtained, in part at least, outside our Conference, as the distinguished representative of Mexico pointed out in his statement on 18 March last (ENDC/PV.395, para. 43).

50. We believe that the time has come to reflect on our activity with a view to leading it back to its principal aim. We have no illusions about the difficulties which lie before us; we are far too realistic for that. But we believe that it is

(Mr. Zagari, Italy)

above all the most recent result obtained in the field of collateral measures, namely, the non-proliferation Treaty, which should lead us to a decisive renewal of disarmament negotiations in our Conference. At the same time we believe that, if we want that to happen, our Conference must change its methods and find a more effective way of organizing its work. The distinguished representative of Mexico made this point brilliantly in his statement on 18 March last (ibid. para. 57).

51. As I have just said, the non-proliferation Treaty, which has already been signed by nearly ninety States, should represent the most effective driving force for our future work. The Conference should, during this session, concentrate essentially on giving full effect to the Treaty by imparting maximum credibility to its provisions, and on maintaining the balance envisaged by the Treaty between its various parts and between the rights and obligations of the Parties to it.

52. We have on several occasions stressed the importance Italy attaches to the non-proliferation Treaty. In our view, it should be a decisive milestone towards the objective of the consolidation of peace. And Italy is convinced that the Treaty can be exceptionally valuable in reducing the present causes of tension and in strengthening confidence among States on the basis of mutual respect for the integrity and independence of each of them.

53. We signed that historic document on 28 January of this year with the political will to contribute to the re-creation of a favourable atmosphere for the renewal of the process of lessening tension in Europe.

54. Italy therefore hopes that its accession to the Treaty may encourage other States which have not yet signed it. The approval given recently to the Treaty by the United States Senate is undoubtedly an important advance because it contributes towards acceleration of the process of accessions. We hope that all nuclear and non-nuclear countries which have not yet acceded to the Treaty will realize, as we have done, that the security of all depends not on the multiplication of nuclear weapons, but on their elimination and, in particular, we hope that all the nuclear Powers without exception will be able to contribute in a responsible manner to the implementation of the Treaty.

(Mr. Zagari, Italy)

55. At the same time, however, it must be said that Italy regards the non-proliferation Treaty as an instrument of disarmament — in other words, not as an end in itself, but as a starting point. So far as we are concerned, this interpretation of the Treaty, which commits us, today, to making a more effective contribution to the disarmament negotiations, is of primary importance. The Treaty will be able to produce concrete and lasting effects to the extent that it creates the appropriate conditions for achieving more balanced relations between the signatory States. This balance can be achieved only through the complete implementation of the Treaty, beginning precisely with the provisions concerning nuclear disarmament. In our opinion, that is the interpretation to be given to article VI, which commits the militarily nuclear Powers to undertake without delay and in good faith negotiations designed to stop the arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament.

56. In this connexion, we cannot but associate ourselves with the wish expressed by the United Nations General Assembly in its appeal (resolution 2456 D (XXIII) ENDC/237) of last December to the United States and Soviet Governments to enter at an early date into discussions on the limitation of strategic armaments. Despite the bilateral character which may be maintained in the initial phase, these discussions touch upon a matter which closely concerns the work of this Conference, under the terms of reference given to it by the General Assembly itself. Therefore there is every reason to hope that at a later stage our Conference will be asked to express its views on these problems.

57. Another necessary condition for the achievement of the balance which I mentioned just now is the development of international collaboration in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, once again in accordance with the broad lines laid down by the non-proliferation Treaty and particularly by the provisions of articles IV and V. In this sphere, the aim of the Treaty is to guarantee and facilitate, through commitments undertaken in this respect by the nuclear countries, free access by non-nuclear countries to raw materials and nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

58. To this end, it is important that concrete initiatives be taken and carried out. They would undoubtedly contribute towards strengthening the confidence we all have in the binding power of these commitments. I need not stress that such confidence plays a vital rôle in the balanced implementation of the Treaty.

(Mr. Zagari, Italy)

59. Today, access to the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy is in fact too strictly limited, to the detriment of the great majority of non-nuclear countries, which thereby find themselves in a position of inferiority and over which a kind of "technological imperialism" is exercised by the militarily nuclear great Powers. The non-proliferation Treaty must aim at surmounting these barriers and overcoming these delays and gaps by associating all countries in the possibilities of the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy.

60. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States has already played a valuable rôle in the identification of the problems of major interest in this field. The study of these problems must be continued and deepened during the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I should like to stress in this connexion that the Italian Government attaches the greatest importance to the success of the action which will have to be taken on that occasion, particularly on behalf of the developing countries. This concerns not only the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, but more generally, the creation of a more just international society in which the possibilities of economic and social progress offered by nuclear technology will be placed at the disposal of all nations on an equal footing.

61. Mr. Chairman, I have already emphasized that the non-proliferation Treaty represents for us a starting point on the road to disarmament. I have also recalled that the various clauses of the Treaty can only be carried out and thus stimulate disarmament negotiations if the Conference is able to establish a more efficient method of work.

62. In our opinion, the central problem of the negotiations entrusted to our Conference, namely general and complete disarmament, has remained for too long in the background.

63. The two drafts -- Soviet and United States, submitted in March and April 1962 respectively -- while they are no longer completely up-to-date, are still of great interest not only by virtue of their proposals but also and above all by virtue of the way in which they envisage the problem of disarmament. Indeed, those drafts provide for a global approach to the problem, an approach that is based on the definition of unitary agreement on an organic programme.

64. We departed from that approach when we began to negotiate various collateral measures separately without taking into account the links which exist between them, and to seek partial agreements in any sector which seemed to offer prospects of progress. Thus, it has been possible to achieve the results which I mentioned at the beginning, even if this has been done, at least partly -- as I have stressed -- outside our Conference.

(Mr. Zagari, Italy)

65. In this connexion, I should like to recall two proposals put forward at Geneva by the Italian Government: one, dated 1 August 1967, concerning the transfer of fissile material intended for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/205); the other, dated 23 August 1968, on underground nuclear explosions (ENDC/234). We remain convinced that these proposals deserve the attention of the Conference, and we shall be glad to resume their discussion with other Governments during the course of our work.

66. However, despite the results to which the "sector by sector" approach has brought us, we are bound to note that this approach has entailed some imbalances and, in particular, that it has not led to any real reduction in armaments. The comment by U Thant in this connexion is certainly striking (ENDC/PV.395, para. 4). It is therefore justifiable to ask oneself, as we ask ourselves, whether the time has not come to tackle anew the problem of the method to be followed during our negotiations.

67. The Italian Government considers that the disarmament discussions must be resumed on the basis of a more organic method than that which has been followed hitherto. Hence, we believe that it would be useful to negotiate in the first place an agreement on a programme. In this programme, we ought (a) to define the measures capable of immediate execution, the implementation of which should prepare and open the way to real disarmament; (b) to outline the main lines and the principles on which the subsequent stages of the disarmament process should be based until it is completed.

68. It is not a question of abandoning or interrupting the work already in progress in the various fields, but, on the contrary, a question of making the most of it and of taking it into consideration within the framework of an over-all plan. We do not intend by our suggestion to propose the immediate discussion of a plan for general and complete disarmament, or to propose, in our turn, amendments to the plans already submitted by the Soviet and United States Governments. We wish, rather, to highlight the advisability of providing for a preparatory phase for the various stages of effective disarmament and

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of establishing the content. At the same time, it is necessary to establish a methodology which would be valid for the whole of the disarmament process -- a methodology which would recognize the existence of certain links between the different measures, so as to avoid any imbalance.

69. What was the purpose of the two Soviet and United States plans for general and complete disarmament? They proposed that the disarmament process should develop gradually in three phases beginning, from the first phase, with measures for the reduction of armaments and continuing with further measures in the two successive phases.

70. In fact, no agreement entailing the immediate implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments has ever been reached. That is probably due to the fact that we wanted to begin at once with the problem of general and complete disarmament before even having taken a first indispensable step, namely, the halting of the armaments race, which, in all logic, should precede and prepare the way for the implementation of the reductions.

71. That consideration has led us to think that it would be preferable for the implementation of disarmament to be preceded by a preparatory or introductory phase -- to which I referred just now; and this for the purpose of establishing during that phase the prerequisites and preliminary conditions necessary for tackling the real problems of disarmament. This introductory phase should relate essentially to the achievement of two aims: the halting of the nuclear arms race and the creation of a climate of political confidence.

72. We believe that, within the framework of this preparatory phase, the problem of stopping the escalation of nuclear armaments must be viewed as whole, taking into account the relationships and links which exist between its various aspects. Consequently, we should place in the same context all stabilization measures aimed at stopping "vertical proliferation", by means of agreements or moratoria in the following sectors: underground nuclear tests, production of fissile material for military purposes, offensive or defensive delivery systems, denuclearization of the sea-bed.

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73. Within the framework of the preparatory phase there could also be included measures designed to create a climate of confidence, such as agreements for reducing the risk of surprise attack and for establishing regional security systems or nuclear-free zones, and especially agreements giving effect to articles IV and V of the non-proliferation Treaty, concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We believe, in particular, that the negotiation and speedy implementation of such agreements would undoubtedly be an essential condition for ensuring greater confidence in the implementation and in the effects of the non-proliferation Treaty.

74. The preparatory phase could also include study measures relating to a first "slice" of armament reductions to be carried out when we pass to the first phase of disarmament.

75. The determination and definition of all the initial measures envisaged in the preparatory phase are nevertheless, in our view, only the first part of the programme on which agreement would have to be reached.

76. Indeed, the second part of this programme should include, as we have already mentioned, definition of the principles on which the whole process of general and complete disarmament should be based in its three successive phases. These principles have already been enunciated in the Soviet-United States Statement of 1961. In our opinion, however, that text should be re-examined today in the light of the experience of recent years, and a study could be made of the extent to which it could be brought up to date and supplemented.

77. We do not wish, through the proposal which I have just made, to specify in detail the contents of the subsequent phases of the disarmament process. We wish merely to focus the attention of the Conference and its work on the preparatory or introductory phase, which should put an end to the nuclear arms race and create an atmosphere of mutual confidence. In this regard we ask for a very clear proof of such a political will on the part of the great Powers.

78. The organic method of work which I have just outlined could be given expression in a practical procedural proposal. In our view, the Eighteen-Nation Committee could indeed adopt, for that purpose, an agenda which would serve as a basis for its work and would cover the various aspects of the preparatory phase. The first item on that agenda would be the discussion of a general programme of disarmament along the lines which I have tried to bring out. Subsequent items would include the discussion, which has in

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fact already begun, of various specific measures, such as the total cessation of nuclear tests, the cessation of the production of fissile material, the denuclearization of the sea-bed, the problem of chemical and biological weapons and other measures preparatory to general and complete disarmament.

79. The discussion on all those measures should not at all be deferred but, on the contrary, should continue parallel with negotiation on the disarmament programme. As soon as agreement has been reached on that programme and, at the same time, substantial progress has been achieved in the negotiation of agreements on the specific measures I have mentioned, we could proceed to the discussion of the concrete contents of the first phase of disarmament. We believe that in negotiating the aforesaid agreements it will be necessary to take account of the existing links between the various preparatory measures which should open the way to disarmament, while at the same time keeping a certain degree of flexibility.

80. I should like to add that by our proposal we also wished to respond to the many appeals made during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly for a resumption of the study of general and complete disarmament by the Geneva Conference. Our proposal could encourage a useful re-examination of the two drafts on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet and United States Governments and, above all, it could lead to a restatement of the principles contained in the United States-Soviet Statement of 20 September 1961.

81. The messages addressed to our Conference by the President of the United States of America (ENDC/239*) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (ENDC/238) confirm our hope that we shall not lack the support of the two greatest nuclear Powers in our work, especially with a view to attaining our main aim, which is nuclear disarmament.

82. We naturally reserve the right to make more precise and to develop our proposal further during the course of the work of this Conference. It is the firm intention of the Italian delegation to continue to make the most positive contribution to that work with a view to attaining the objectives of disarmament in the interest of security and peace.

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83. The aim to be pursued by this Conference, as well as by Governments and peoples, is the creation of a world which will enable the nations to co-exist peacefully in a more just and orderly society. In the face of the frightening threat of new means of destruction, only the age-old human aspiration for disarmament can lead us to the necessary transformation of international society.

84. The same progress which created the deadly weapons of today can enable humanity to free itself from fear and at last to place all its vast resources at the service of mankind.

85. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Everybody will have asked himself, now that the Eighteen-Nation Committee has resumed its work: Where do we go from here? What can we hope to achieve? Or, rather, what measures of disarmament must we achieve this year? The risk is great, as everybody knows, that the armaments race will run faster and faster ahead of us, leaving us with a feeling of frustration, as our task automatically becomes more and more gigantic.

86. All the delegations which have spoken so far have testified to the fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee stands at an important crossroads. My delegation wants to believe that we have a right to approach this session with considerable expectations. We must make progress, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament.

87. When attempting to take stock of the factors working for or against our hope of success we can, I believe, point to some encouraging signs, but also, alas, to some irrefutable facts which paint a rather sombre background, but thereby make more urgent the need for substantial efforts. One positive factor consists of the renewed statements made by the Governments of the super-Powers that they intend to initiate bilateral negotiations on the limitation of the strategic missile systems, offensive and defensive. The world has been eagerly waiting for a long time to see this new spiralling of the arms race blocked. The new weapons development which is now imminent threatens to upset the rough equilibrium achieved, and thus the sense of security, already so brittle, is being turned into a feeling of near despair. Repeated earlier pleas by the international community of nations that the super-Powers should agree in the first instance on a freeze were endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 2456 D (XIII), which was adopted without any dissenting voices and with only a handful of abstentions. In that resolution the General Assembly

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"Urges the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles." (ENDC/237)

88. Clearly, this is now the most pressing of all disarmament matters. There are many indications of an acceleration of the arms race in both the United States and the Soviet Union. New and more effective types of nuclear weapons are being developed and deployed. The Press is full of news as to how anti-ballistic missile systems are being deployed and developed within both super-Powers. But the defensive ABM is not all. In its wake new and more effective delivery systems are being tested, thus manifolding the offensive striking power. But when facing this endlessly horrifying future, both sides also seem to recognize that there is still time to stop this crazy new nuclear arms race, and the rest of mankind is eagerly expecting that the recent positive statements of intention will practically immediately be followed up by decisions to initiate the talks and to pursue them with all speed and in good faith.

89. When similar pleas to the super-Powers were made here in the Committee at our session last summer, it was pointed out by several representatives that when the bilateral talks get under way the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be kept informed about their progress. This is more than desirable. It is necessary because parts of the progress we hope to obtain in our own work within the Committee are linked up with achievements in the bilateral discussions -- and, more important, without clearly ascertainable progress in those negotiations it is difficult to see how any increase in confidence and any general improvement in the international climate could be brought about. And this is sorely needed at the present time, not least in Europe.

90. Another factor which may be interpreted as positive in the general picture is the progress, slow but steady, towards an operational non-proliferation Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex). Some ten countries have now ratified the Treaty -- amongst them one of the nuclear-weapon Powers, the United Kingdom. In the United States ratification has been approved by the Senate. The second main architect of the Treaty, the Soviet Union, must now follow suit in order to make the Treaty enforceable.

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91. Almost ninety States have signed the Treaty, and some of them have initiated the ratification process. But some important signatures are still missing. Sweden entertains reasonable confidence that enough of the States which are important in this regard will move ahead now that the United States has taken decisive action.

92. One point that should certainly not go unobserved by us is the link between this Treaty and further progress on nuclear disarmament. The non-proliferation Treaty, and particularly its article VI, in fact constitutes a promissory note issued by the nuclear-weapon Powers that they are to proceed with further disarmament negotiations. All those who become parties to the Treaty acquire a legal right to hold the super-Powers to their liability to fulfil this obligation.

93. Even before it is legally enforceable, this Treaty is evidently beginning to serve many States as a norm for their behaviour. When the Treaty enters into force we should be able to say proudly that the prospect of nuclear weapons spreading to further States has been effectively counteracted. With that action on the record, the non-nuclear-weapon States will truly have made an historical contribution to the cause of peace.

94. A further positive factor, auguring well for our work during this session, is that we have before us an agreed agenda. This agenda, adopted last August by all member States of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, also prescribes that highest priority should be given to negotiations on "Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". (ENDC/236, p. 3) This priority of ours was substantively endorsed by the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted two resolutions -- virtually without any dissenting votes -- in which this Committee was urged to make speedy progress in nuclear disarmament fields. I am referring to resolution 2454 B (XXIII) on the question of general and complete disarmament and resolution 2455 (XXIII) on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (ENDC/237). The Committee will of course, have to analyse carefully the contents of these resolutions and apply all the joint ingenuity of its members to arrive at solutions to the problems treated therein. The representative of Mexico issued a very wholesome warning in his statement at the 395th meeting on 18 March that the very existence of this Committee and of course its claim to respect and trustworthiness are at stake. The representatives of Nigeria and the United Kingdom echoed this warning at the

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396th meeting. We cannot afford to face the General Assembly with empty hands as far as these most important items are concerned, after so many years of labour devoted to them.

95. As regards the first of the resolutions mentioned, I should like to repeat something I ventured to suggest when the matter was discussed in November in the First Committee of the United Nations -- it bears some resemblance to the statement made by the representative of Italy today. I said that in suggesting that:

"... we now take a new look at the plans for a phased approach to general and complete disarmament, I have been encouraged by the fact that we already have, through our deliberations on partial measures, covered a not insignificant part of what was to be achieved during the first stage, according to the existing plans for general and complete disarmament.

"Thus, both plans presented by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively in the ENDC in the spring of 1962, foresaw important disarmament measures in the nuclear field already during this first stage. Several of them have been dealt with or are included in ENDC's agenda for next year.

It might be possible immediately to single out what remains of such proposals in the plans, and from now on concentrate negotiations on all these nuclear subjects according to a package formula." (A/C.1/PV.1609, provisional, pp.62 and 63-65)

And I continued later on in that same intervention as follows:

"The composing of some such balanced 'packages' also outside the nuclear field would be a stimulating new exercise for the ENDC. It would also mean a turn towards realism, coming much closer to issues besetting the political anxieties of today" (ibid., p. 63-65)

-- that is, of course, in many parts of the world.

96. I should very much like to invite the comments of my fellow representatives on these suggestions. Surely we must not, for the sake of partial disarmament measures, forget to try to achieve a swifter course towards the realization of our cardinal task, general and complete disarmament.

97. In regard to our work here in the Committee this session we have, from our agreed agenda and from the guidelines given to us by the United Nations, rather clear indications of some matters in the nuclear field which should be pursued immediately and vigorously: in the first instance a legal arrangement for a comprehensive test ban and, materially, the cessation of underground nuclear testing. This matter is also the one which would most directly benefit from a start on the bilateral talks about limiting the strategic nuclear-weapon systems. The connexion is obvious between

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continued underground nuclear tests and continued development of existing nuclear-weapon systems. We should no longer, by our permissiveness towards the tests going on, silently condone the development of ever more diabolic megadeath machines. The work on prohibitive agreements in both fields must proceed pari passu; the responsibility for promoting action along the two lines might well be shared by nuclear-weapon Powers and the rest of the Committee members. I for one promise that in a statement next week I shall attempt to expound the methods by which progress should be sought towards a comprehensive test ban -- this as a consequence of the fact that this issue has been waiting so long for sincere consideration by those Powers which have not forsworn nuclear weapons and which still seem to feel free to race for more.

98. The second item in a logically interlocking package of further nuclear disarmament measures must be attended to also: it is the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons use. An agreement banning such vertical proliferation may in fact be politically easier to achieve than a test ban, since for the mighty it is no longer such a powerful temptation to increase the quantity as it is to increase the quality of weapons. We are looking forward to statements from delegations which have earlier evidenced special interest in this matter.

99. Turning now from the nuclear field we should recall that the General Assembly at its session last year gave a valuable push to the cause of disarmament in yet some other directions. I am referring first to resolution 2454 A(XXIII) in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare with the assistance of qualified experts a concise report on biological and chemical means of warfare. The work of the experts seems to be well under way. Despite the heavy load of work and the tightness of the timetable decided by the Assembly there is good hope that the report will be available by 1 July 1969 -- that is, while our summer session is still on. This favourable situation in regard to the Secretary-General's study should make it possible to induce the United Nations General Assembly at its next session to take further action in this field, so full of hidden and hideous menaces. But this in turn presupposes that this Committee also proceeds actively with its part of the preparations for such action. Several important tasks should be undertaken by us without delay. The Eighteen-Nation Committee must outline how to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol by securing wider adherence to it. The Swedish delegation believes that the best means would be by obtaining an authoritatively agreed clarification as to the widest possible interpretation of the prohibitions contained therein in regard to the biological and chemical means of warfare. Therefore my delegation intends to revert to these suggestions at a somewhat later stage, but of course we welcome all contributions which other delegations will be keen to make to our negotiations on this harrowing matter.

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100. The General Assembly last year also took some important decisions in a field that is relatively new but is covered by our agenda of August 1968 -- namely, the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. I am referring specifically to General Assembly resolution 2467 A(XXIII). It established a new permanent Committee concerned with all matters relating to the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. In paragraph 3 of the operative part of that resolution the United Nations Committee is called upon, inter alia, to take into account "the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament...".

101. The existence of the permanent Committee is certainly not any excuse for passivity on the part of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. On the contrary, it is highly important that there be established what I might dare to call "constructive overlapping" between the work of the sea-bed Committee and that of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. This has obviously been recognized by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States. The emphasis they placed on the sea-bed issue in their opening statements has already been duly noted by previous speakers. In this context the Soviet initiative in putting forward a full draft treaty text (ENDC/240) is particularly interesting. We wish to compliment the delegation of the Soviet Union on this initiative and on the care with which its text has been elaborated.

102. We would propose that after a general exchange of views between delegations, covering naturally also the sea-bed subject, some informal meetings of the whole Committee be set aside for a detailed discussion of the Soviet draft. The procedure might involve redrafting of the text on some points, and it does not seem propitious to proceed by announcing formal positions in our groping for a consensus on such a text. If such a task were undertaken in a spirit of compromise and good will on all sides, I am sure that, on the basis of the draft presented by the Soviet Union, we would be able to arrive speedily at a reasonable solution. Needless to say, such an agreed treaty text would form a most valuable part of our next report to the United Nations General Assembly. It would take the form, I presume, of a recommendation to all Members of the United Nations to endorse our agreed text by a resolution, in order that a treaty may rapidly come into being by the usual procedure. We have a good precedent in the non-proliferation Treaty. This time, however, the task should be accomplished without delay. We cannot afford to give free course to a new arms race on the sea-bed, or even any more time for planning it.

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103. As I conclude this introductory statement it may be useful if I sum up the action which the Swedish delegation is proposing for the work during this session, recognizing that the item of most overshadowing urgency, namely the limitation of the strategic nuclear-weapon systems, will necessarily be a primary concern for the super-Powers.

104. As the over-all task, the Committee should undertake to examine initial steps towards real arms limitation and disarmament. For this purpose, balanced package formulae may be sought from existing plans for general and complete disarmament, and the plans themselves may be brought up to date and appropriately reorganized, both in the field of nuclear weapons and in regard to other means of warfare. This covers item 4 of our agenda.

105. The following partial measures, which pertain to our agenda and are fairly well prepared for action, might form parts of such packages.

(1) (a) The comprehensive test ban constitutes one issue on which the Committee cannot any longer fail to reach substantial progress. A draft treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests should be submitted, to be negotiated immediately and simultaneously with the bilateral talks on curtailment of a further nuclear arms race;

(b) The cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons use constitutes another issue on which progress may be facilitated through the bilateral talks. The cut-off, too, should thus be prepared for agreement in a way similar to the test ban.

(2) Ways should be found for strengthening the application of existing international legislation banning the use of biological and chemical means of warfare.

(3) Plans for effective demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be made ready for submission to the United Nations.

106. This work programme may seem unduly heavy. But if we do not set our goals high we may find ourselves, at the end of our session, having made little or no headway at all. The world is impatiently expecting from us some conclusive progress; therefore I have wanted to indicate the fields in which the Swedish delegation believes that progress is realistically realizable, provided the will to work of all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is commensurable with the task entrusted to us.

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107. Finally, in this connexion I should like to stress how important we feel it to be that full use be made of the time available for this year's session. It has started late. That is one reason why we ought to continue right through as long as there is scope for progress on any issue.

108. The representative of Mexico, in his interesting intervention on the first day of this session, put forward some valuable suggestions as to ways and means of making our working methods more effective. Other delegations have spoken in the same vein. We should devote, I suggest, a special meeting -- which might be of an informal nature -- to these and possible other suggestions which may be brought forward with the same aim of speeding up our march forward.

109. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): As will be recalled, the Committee unanimously agreed on 15 August 1968 to include in its programme of work the item on the establishment of nuclear-free zones (ENDC/236, p.3). As a modest contribution to the consideration of this item, my delegation yesterday handed in to the Secretariat a working document for reproduction as a Conference document. At a later meeting of the Committee I shall venture to make some observations and comments on the contents of this working document. For the present, I merely wish to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that the Secretariat, with its usual efficiency, has already distributed this morning the English and Spanish versions of this working document, and I am informed that tomorrow or at the latest the day after tomorrow the French and Russian versions will be circulated. The symbol number of this document is ENDC/241.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 397th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M. Klusák, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, Italy, Sweden and Mexico.

"The delegation of Mexico submitted a working document on the Establishment of Nuclear-Free Zones (ENDC/241).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 27 March 1969 at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

